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STRIPPING DOWN A VICTORY FOR ADULT
ENTERTAINMENT: SHOWTIME
ENTERTAINMENT, LLC V. TOWN OF MENDON
ETHAN BOND*
In a win for adult entertainment, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in
Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon struck down a town’s
zoning ordinance restricting the size and operating hours of a nude dancing
establishment. The First Circuit explained that the town did not adequately
support its concerns that the business would cause harmful secondary
effects and therefore could not limit the business’s operation.
This Comment traces the history of adult entertainment zoning
jurisprudence, placing special emphasis on the Supreme Court’s Renton
test and Alameda burden-shifting approach. It then argues that the First
Circuit’s ruling is inconsistent with the Renton and Alameda framework
and should be overturned because the court improperly required the town to
meet a heightened burden of proof. The town provided adequate support
that the adult business would alter the town’s rural charm and cause traffic
congestion along Route 16 and therefore should have been allowed to
“experiment with solutions” to these problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Your children take the bus home from school one afternoon. Their
regular commute takes about fifteen minutes. Although you live in a
mostly rural town, it includes a small commercial district that lies on the
border of Route 16. The district contains a few warehouses, a drive-in
movie theater, and some restaurants. Your children look out the window
and take in their surroundings as they do every day on the bus ride home.
One child spots something new: a 9,000 square foot establishment on the

*Thank you Duke Ho, Britta Norwick, and Professor Kimberly West-Faulcon for helpful
comments and suggestions. I want to give a very special thanks to Professor Mary Dant for her
efforts. All mistakes are my own.
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edge of the commercial district. At the top of the building, a sign reads,
“Live! Nude Dancers.”1
In May 2008, the town of Mendon, Massachusetts enacted zoning
regulations intended to mitigate the effects of adult entertainment
businesses by limiting their location to select parcels bordering Route 16.2
The preamble to section 5.01 read:
The purpose of this Adult Entertainment Overlay District section
of the Town of Mendon Zoning Bylaws is to address and
mitigate the secondary effects of adult entertainment
establishments . . . . These effects include increased crime, and
adverse effects on public health, the business climate, the
property values of residential and commercial property and the
quality of life.
The provisions of this section have neither the purpose nor intent
of imposing a limitation on the content of any communicative
matter or materials, including sexually oriented matter or
materials. Similarly, it is not the purpose or intent of this
Section (Overlay District) to restrict or deny access to adult
entertainment establishments or to sexually oriented matter or
materials that is protected by the Constitutions of the United
States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts . . . .3
The following month, Showtime Entertainment LLC (“Showtime”)
applied for a license to build a nude dancing club on one of these parcels.4
The proposed establishment would comprise approximately 8,935 square

1. This paragraph is hypothetical and “Live! Nude Dancers” is not the actual name of
Showtime’s establishment. Per Mendon’s bylaws, it is unclear whether an adult establishment
can erect a sign reading “Live! Nude Dancers.” While section 5.01(f)(iii) mandates that a
business cannot erect a sign conveying sexual content, section 5.01(f)(iv) allows an adult
establishment to construct a sign identifying the name and purpose of the business. MENDON,
MASS., ZONING BY-LAWS art. 5, § 5.01(f)(iii)-(iv) (2016).
2. Showtime Entm’t, LLC v. Mendon, Mass. (Showtime II), 769 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir.
2014).
3. Id.; see also MENDON, MASS., ZONING BY-LAWS art. 5, § 5.01(b) (2016).
4. Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 67.
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feet, with space to accommodate 244 patrons and 82 parking spaces.5 At a
public hearing on September 15, 2008, town residents voiced their
disapproval of the proposed project.6 They encouraged the Board of
Selectmen (“Board”) to enact additional bylaws: (1) imposing height and
size restrictions on adult entertainment establishments, (2) limiting the
operating hours of these businesses, and (3) banning the sale and
consumption of alcohol on the property.7
The town rejected Showtime’s proposal, citing public health, safety,
noise pollution, and traffic concerns.8 A week later, the town held a special
public meeting to discuss the negative effects adult entertainment
businesses cause on surrounding areas.9 In particular, residents identified
three primary justifications for enacting additional restrictions: (1) to
protect Mendon’s “historically rural atmosphere,” (2) to ensure traffic
safety and prevent traffic congestion, and (3) to reduce crime that results
from a combination of adult entertainment and alcohol.10 During the
meeting, the residents voted to amend Mendon’s bylaws.11 Under the
amended ordinance, no adult entertainment establishment could exceed
2,000 square feet in area and fourteen feet in height, open earlier than 4:30
p.m. on school days, or sell alcohol on its premises.12
Showtime amended its application to comply with the new bylaws
and included plans to build a single-story, 2,000-square-foot building that
would accommodate 74 customers and a parking lot with 103 spaces.13
Showtime also agreed not to open before 4:30 p.m. or sell alcohol on its
property.14 It also presented a traffic study, which concluded that “[p]eak5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 67–68
11. Id. At 67.
12. Id. at 67–68.
13. Id. at 68.
14. See id.
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hour traffic volume increases as a result of the development [would] have
negligible impacts on [traffic near the Overlay District].”15 On May 3,
2010, the Board approved Showtime’s amended proposal.16
Nevertheless, Showtime sued the town of Mendon in federal court,
claiming that the zoning bylaws restricting its size and hours of operation
were unconstitutional restrictions of expressive activity under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.17 It also claimed that Article
16 of the Massachusetts state constitution precluded the alcohol ban.18
However, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mendon,
concluding that the zoning and alcohol restrictions were constitutional.19
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and remanded the
zoning claims back to the district court for entry of summary judgment in
favor of Showtime.20 Finding that the alcohol claim involved complex
issues of state constitutional law, the First Circuit certified questions
concerning the alcohol ban to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
(“SJC”) to resolve.21
This Comment will first provide an overview of adult entertainment
zoning jurisprudence and the Supreme Court’s treatment of ordinances that
restrict an adult business’s ability to operate. It will then argue that, in the
case of Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon, the First Circuit
misapplied Supreme Court precedent in striking down Mendon’s ordinance
by imposing a heightened standard. This Comment does not address the
SJC’s ruling on the alcohol ban.22

15. Id.
16. Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 68.
17. Id. at 69.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 82.
21. Id. at 82–83.
22. See generally Showtime Entm’t, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 32 N.E.3d 1259 (Mass.
2015). For curious readers, the SJC concluded that Mendon had a substantial government interest
in regulating crime and an alcohol ban could reasonably serve that purpose, but the ban was not
adequately tailored to further this purpose. Id. at 1263–67
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II. MUNICIPAL ZONING OF ADULT ENTERTAINMENT BUSINESSES:
OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION
This section will briefly explore traditional First Amendment
jurisprudence and chronologically trace the Supreme Court’s treatment of
adult entertainment zoning ordinances.
A. The First Amendment and a Multi-Step Approach
The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech.23 Not all speech is created equal,
however, and the Supreme Court has found that certain categories of
speech are entitled to lesser constitutional protection than others.24 In
Miller v. California, the Court declared that while the First Amendment
protects works that have “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value, . . . the public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake,
and for the ensuing commercial gain, is a different matter.”25 As Justice
Stevens famously quipped in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., “few
of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the
citizen’s right to see ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theaters
of our choice.”26
Despite society’s “lesser interest in protecting

23. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (“[E]ven though
we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials
that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type
of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled
political debate that inspired Voltaire's immortal comment.”); Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the
Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging
Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 804–05 (2004) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
valuation of political speech, commercial speech, and fighting words and the standard of scrutiny
such speech is afforded).
25. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34–35 (1973) (“[T]o equate the free and robust
exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans
the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for
freedom.”). Miller established the three-part test for obscenity and reaffirmed the principle that
obscene material is not constitutionally protected. Id. at 24. Yet commercial entities that market
non-obscene, erotic materials (such as adult movie theaters and adult bookstores) enjoy some
First Amendment protection.
26. Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
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commercial material, such as borderline pornography,” this speech is still
protected by the First Amendment, albeit to a limited extent.27
The Supreme Court takes a multistep approach in evaluating the
constitutionality of zoning ordinances that regulate adult entertainment
businesses.28 First, it determines whether the ordinance completely bans
the business from residing within municipal limits or if it merely restricts
the time, place, and manner the business can operate.29
Second, it determines whether the time, place, and manner restriction
is content-based or content-neutral.30 For reasons that will become
apparent, some scholars suggest that this distinction is often confusing,
arbitrary, and impossible to discern.31 Others suggest that the Supreme
Court has incorrectly framed the analysis.32 However meritorious these
critiques, this Comment will not explore the depths of that discussion.
Rather, this Comment will focus on the distinction as the Supreme Court
has developed and interpreted it.
1. The Content Distinction
The Supreme Court places great emphasis on the content distinction,
that is, whether a government restriction on lawful speech is “contentbased” or “content-neutral.”33 As the Court has framed the analysis, a
27. See id. (acknowledging that the First Amendment would not tolerate the total
suppression of non-obscene, erotic materials); Matthew L. McGinnis, Sex, But Not the City:
Adult-Entertainment Zoning, the First Amendment, and Residential and Rural Municipalities, 46
B.C. L. REV. 625, 634 (2005).
28. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 47.
31. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
STAN. L. REV. 113, 128–50 (1981) (arguing that content-neutral regulations should logically be as
suspect as content-based regulations because both impair the free flow of expression, and
accordingly, the content distinction should be abandoned as theoretically invalid and
pragmatically unworkable).
32. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom
of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 56–64 (2000)
(identifying three problems with how the Court has applied the principle of content neutrality).
33. See id. at 53 ("Today, virtually every free speech case turns on the application of the
distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws.”).

BOND_FINALX2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

5/31/2016 12:53 PM

STRIPPING DOWN A VICTORY FOR ADULT ENTERTAINMENT

255

content-based regulation restricts a particular form of speech on the basis of
its “message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”34 For example, in
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, a Chicago ordinance banned
picketing near school grounds except for picketing involving peaceful labor
disputes.35
The Court struck down the ordinance, concluding it
impermissibly discriminated against all non-labor picketing because of its
subject matter without offering a legitimate reason why peaceful labor
picketing was allowed.36
Similarly in United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, the Court found that a federal telecommunications
regulation requiring cable providers to “scramble” or block sexually
explicit channels during late-night hours was content-based, because it
singled out promiscuous material.37 The law aimed to prevent “signal
bleed” where children might mistakenly have access to the adult content.38
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, explained that the regulation
“focuse[d] only on the content of the speech and the direct impact that
speech ha[d] on its listeners.”39
Content-based speech restrictions are “presumptively invalid” and are
therefore subject to strict scrutiny.40 Under strict scrutiny, a content-based
speech regulation survives only if it is “narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling Government interest” and the means used to achieve that
interest are “the least restrictive” available.41 Such content-based speech
regulations will rarely be upheld.42
34. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
35. Id. at 92–93.
36. See id. at 100–01 (“If peaceful labor picketing is permitted, there is no justification for
prohibiting all non-labor picketing, both peaceful and non-peaceful. ‘Peaceful’ non-labor
picketing, however the term ‘peaceful’ is defined, is obviously no more disruptive than ‘peaceful’
labor picketing. But Chicago's ordinance permits the latter and prohibits the former.”).
37. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 806–07, 811–12 (2000).
38. Id. at 806.
39. Id. at 811 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
40. Id. at 813–817.
41. Id. at 813 (emphasis added) (citing Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989)).
42. Id. at 818 ("The Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments,
including esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature, can be formed, tested, and
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By contrast, a content-neutral speech regulation serves purposes
“unrelated to the content” of expression and therefore receives a lesser
degree of scrutiny.43 A content-neutral restriction on the time, place, and or
manner of speech is permissible if it is narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest and leaves open ample alternative channels
of communication.44 The Supreme Court officially recognized the time,
place, and manner test in the context of adult entertainment in Renton v.
Playtime Theaters.45 In analyzing the content distinction of the zoning
ordinance, the Renton Court reasoned that the “predominate” goal of the
legislation was to prevent the “secondary effects” of the speech—i.e., the
harmful effects the speech has on the quality of the neighborhood—and not
the content of the speech itself.46 Although the regulation facially singled
out adult establishments for discriminatory treatment, the Court deemed the
ordinance content-neutral because the city’s primary purpose was to
minimize deleterious effects to the community.47 Thus, under Renton, an
adult entertainment zoning ordinance is said to regulate only the
“secondary effects” of such speech and will generally be deemed contentneutral.48

expressed. What the Constitution says is that these judgments are for the individual to make, not
for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.”).
43. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 662 (1994) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral speech restrictions because they generally “pose a less
substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue”); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 429 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (explaining that a content-neutral speech restriction
affects speech only incidentally and clarifying the legal standard applicable to time, place, and
manner regulations).
44. Ward, 429 U.S. at 791.
45. David J. Christiansen, Zoning and the First Amendment Rights of Adult
Entertainment, 22 VAL. UNIV. L. REV. 695, 712 & n.127 (1988) (noting that, before Renton,
Justice Powell had suggested adoption of the time, place, and manner standard in his concurring
opinion in Young).
46. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
47. See id. at 47–48.
48. Id. But see McGinnis, supra note 27, at 629 n.35 (collecting legal scholarship that
maintains that adult entertainment zoning ordinances are not content-neutral, despite the Court’s
interpretation in Renton); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (naming the content-neutral designation in Renton as “a fiction”). For a
good analysis on how the Court’s intent-based approach further blurs the content distinction, see
Chemerinsky, supra note 32, at 59–61.

BOND_FINALX2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

5/31/2016 12:53 PM

STRIPPING DOWN A VICTORY FOR ADULT ENTERTAINMENT

257

2. The Renton Test
Where an adult establishment is regulated by a content-neutral time,
manner, or place restriction, courts apply the Renton test, a form of
intermediate scrutiny.49 Under the Renton test, a zoning regulation of adult
businesses is constitutional where it: (1) is narrowly tailored to serve a
substantial government purpose and (2) leaves open alternative channels of
communication.50
A municipality may satisfy the first prong under Renton by showing
that the secondary effects it hopes to prevent are important and the
regulation “affect[s] only that category of [businesses] shown to produce
the unwanted secondary effects.”51 The regulation may not be “underinclusive,” meaning it cannot regulate only some businesses that produce
the unwanted secondary effects while leaving others unscathed.52
Furthermore, the municipality need not provide studies proving that its
regulation will be effective.53 It may rely upon studies by foreign cities and
upon any evidence “reasonably believed to be relevant” to addressing its
problems.54
A municipality may satisfy the second prong under Renton by
showing that its regulation does not prevent a business owner from
otherwise espousing his message.55 For example, a city may show that the
business owner can operate his establishment elsewhere within city limits.56

49. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 440 (identifying the Renton standard as “intermediate
scrutiny”).
50. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47; Christiansen, supra note 45, at 712 (describing the Renton
test applied in adult entertainment cases as a similar but relaxed standard of the traditional time,
place, and manner test).
51. Renton, 475 U.S. at 52. Though the Court did not explain what makes a government
interest “substantial,” it appears to have assumed that cities have important interests in regulating
crime and maintaining the quality of their neighborhoods.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 51–52.
54. Id. at 51–52.
55. See id. at 54.
56. See id.
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B. Zoning Adult Entertainment Businesses—The Supreme Court Develops a
Standard
This section focuses on the Supreme Court’s holdings in several cases
where municipalities enacted legislation limiting the operation of adult
businesses.
1. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. (1976)—In a Case of First
Impression, the Supreme Court Upholds a Zoning Ordinance That
Dispersed, but Did Not Band, Adult Businesses
The Supreme Court first tackled adult entertainment zoning in the
1976 case Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. (“Young”).57 In Young,
the Court upheld a Detroit ordinance aimed at dispersing adult movie
theaters from a single, concentrated area.58 Under the ordinance, adult
theaters could not operate within 1,000 feet of each other or within 500 feet
of a residential area.59 The alleged purpose of the ordinance was to
preserve the “quality of urban life” by removing concentrated areas of adult
business that exacerbated crime and diminished surrounding property
values.60
The Court determined that the ordinance, which merely aimed to
scatter these businesses, was a “place” restriction—not a total ban on adult
entertainment.61 The Court then found that the ordinance was contentneutral because, although it singled out adult businesses on the basis of
their content, the primary purpose of the regulation was to mitigate these
harmful secondary effects—namely, surges in crime and drops in property
values.62
Although this case was decided before Renton, the Young Court
appeared to formulate early sketches of the Renton test. Notably, the
Detroit ordinance singled out only businesses that displayed nudity.63
57. Young, 427 U.S. at 50; see McGinnis, supra note 27, at 632.
58. Young, 427 U.S. at 52, 72.
59. Id. at 52.
60. See id. at 55; see also McGinnis, supra note 27, at 634.
61. See Young, 427 U.S. at 63.
62. See id. at 71–72; McGinnis, supra note 27, at 634.
63. Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
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Thus, the ordinance appeared to target businesses on the basis of their
content. However, the Young Court found that the primary intent behind
the ordinance was not to prohibit businesses from displaying nudity, but to
reduce the harm those businesses have on the quality of urban life.64 The
Young Court accordingly found the ordinance content-neutral.65
The Court inferred that Detroit’s aims were “significant governmental
interests,”66 and it alluded to “alternative avenues of communication” when
it found that the ordinance, which did not ban but merely dispersed these
businesses, left the adult entertainment market “essentially unrestrained.”67
Ultimately, the Young Supreme Court upheld the ordinance.68
2. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim (1981)—The Supreme Court
Invalidates a Zoning Ordinance Imposing an Outright Ban on Live
Entertainment
In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim (“Schad”), the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional an ordinance that mandated a total ban on all
forms of live entertainment in a residential community, including nude
dancing.69 In striking down the ordinance, the Court found that Young was
not controlling because the ordinance there imposed a “place” restriction,
not an outright ban.70
The Court reasoned that the regulation in Schad failed on two fronts.71
First, the regulation was not narrowly tailored to serve any important
64. Id. at 71–72. .
65. See id. at 70–73 (“Such a line may be drawn on the basis of content without violating
the government's paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication.
For the regulation of the places where sexually explicit films may be exhibited is unaffected by
whatever social, political, or philosophical message a film may be intended to communicate;
whether a motion picture ridicules or characterizes one point of view or another, the effect of the
ordinances is exactly the same.”).
66. See id. at 63 n.18, 71 (“[T]he city’s interest in attempting to preserve the quality of
urban life is one that must be accorded high respect.”).
67. Id. at 62.
68. See id. at 70–73.
69. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
70. Id. at 71–72.
71. See id. at 74–76 (finding the regulation was not “narrowly drawn” and did not leave
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government interest.72 The town, which did not offer any justification on
the face of its ordinance, later explained that its ban was necessary to serve
its goal of catering to the “immediate needs” of town residents and
ensuring that parking, trash, and police protection would not be impacted.73
According to the Court, however, the town fatally failed to explain how a
sweeping ban was necessary to address these goals.74 Second, the
ordinance did not leave open alternative channels of communication for
businesses because they could not operate anywhere within town limits.75
Therefore, the ordinance did not withstand scrutiny.76
3. Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. (1986)—The Supreme Court Upholds
an Ordinance Requiring Relocation of Adult Businesses
Perhaps no Supreme Court opinion more directly mirrors the facts of
Showtime than Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. (“Renton”). In Renton,
the Supreme Court upheld a city’s zoning ordinance restricting the location
of adult entertainment establishments.77 Under the regulation, no adult
establishment could reside within 1,000 feet of residential property or
within one mile of any school.78 The purpose of the regulation was to
prevent the secondary effects caused by these businesses, such as increased
crime.79 The ordinance left open approximately 520 acres, or five percent
of Renton’s total area, on which these businesses could operate.80

open “alternative channels of communication”).
72. Id. at 73–74.
73. Id. at 67, 72–73.
74. See id. at 74 (“The Borough has not established that its interests could not be met by
restrictions that are less intrusive on protected forms of expression.”).
75. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 75–76.
76. See id. at 77.
77. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54–55.
78. Id. at 44.
79. See id. at 48.
80. See id. at 53.
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The Supreme Court began by applying its multi-step inquiry.81 First,
it found that the ordinance imposed a place restriction, not a total ban,
because it allowed adult businesses to relocate within city limits.82 Second,
it found the restriction content-neutral.83 The Court explained that although
the ordinance had content-based elements because it specifically targeted
adult businesses on the basis of their suggestive content, the legislative
intent of the ordinance was to eliminate the secondary effects they caused.84
Next, the Supreme Court enumerated and then applied its twopronged test—which would later become a staple in adult entertainment
zoning jurisprudence.85 First, it determined that the city demonstrated a
substantial government interest, noting that “a city’s interest in attempting
to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high
respect.”86 Although the city had not provided its own studies supporting
its concerns about the secondary effects of adult businesses, it was allowed
to “rely on the experiences of . . . other cities,” and was “allowed a
reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious
problems.”87 The city could rely on any information “reasonably believed
to be relevant to the problem the city addresses.”88
The Court also noted that the ordinance was sufficiently “narrowly
tailored” because it affected “only that category of theaters shown to
produce the unwanted secondary effects.”89 Therefore, the ordinance was

81. See id. at 46–54 (proceeding by first describing the ordinance as a time, manner, or
place regulation, then determining the content-distinction, then analyzing the “substantial
government interest” and “reasonable alternative avenues of communication”).
82. See id. at 46.
83. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48–49.
84. See id. at 47–49.
85. See id. at 50–54; see also McGinnis, supra note 27, at 626–27 (describing the Renton
test); Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425; City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
86. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.
87. Id. at 51–52.
88. Id. at 51.
89. Id. at 52.
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not “under-inclusive.”90 The Court elaborated that the city could withstand
future under-inclusiveness challenges by later amending its bylaws if and
when other businesses produced similar secondary effects.91
Second, the Court found that the ordinance left open alternative
channels of communication for adult businesses.92 It noted that, although
adult businesses could only relocate to five percent of the city’s total land,
the mere fact that the ordinance left “some areas” open to these businesses
was legally sufficient to pass muster.93
4. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. (2000)—A Municipality May Rely on
Evidence of Secondary Effects from the Cities in Renton and Young
In City of Erie, v. Pap’s A.M. (“Pap’s A.M.”), a Supreme Court
plurality upheld a city’s statute that criminalized all forms of public
nudity.94 The ordinance’s preamble read that its purpose was to limit the
adverse impacts of live nudity on “public health, safety and welfare.”95 It
required that erotic dancers wear at least “pasties” and a “G-string.”96
Although the city offered its own evidence supporting its assessment of
these secondary effects, the Court found that it could properly rely on the
evidence set forth in Renton and Young that even a single adult
establishment in a neighborhood causes harmful secondary effects.97
Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, flatly rejected Justice
Souter’s argument that a city must develop an “evidentiary record”
supporting its ordinance.98 O’Connor also rejected the dissenting view’s
“questioning the wisdom” of the city’s approach.99 Echoing Renton,
90. Id.
91. See id. at 52–53.
92. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53–54.
93. See id. at 54.
94. See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 283.
95. Id. at 290.
96. Id. at 284.
97. Id. at 297.
98. See id. at 299–300.
99. See id. at 299–301.
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O’Connor reasoned that the city was allowed to “experiment with solutions
to admittedly serious problems,” even where other remedies would clearly
prove more effective.100 The city’s chosen approach need only “further the
[government’s] interest” in reducing secondary effects.101
5. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. (2002)—The Supreme Court
Solidifies Its Burden-Shifting Approach Within the Renton Framework
In City of L.A. Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. (“Alameda
Books”), the Supreme Court— again by plurality— upheld a Los Angeles
zoning ordinance that prohibited more than one adult establishment from
operating in a single building or structure.102 By enacting the ordinance,
the city hoped to reduce the effects of crime inherent in areas of
concentrated adult businesses.103 Like the regulations in Young and
Renton, the regulation in Alameda Books aimed to disperse adult businesses
but not ban them outright.104 In support of its ordinance, the city cited a
1977 police study concluding that concentrated areas of adult businesses
are associated with more crime.105
The Alameda Books plurality focused its discussion on the first prong
of the two-part Renton test and, in particular, the degree of proof necessary
to show that the city’s ordinance served its “substantial government
interest” in reducing crime.106 The Court reasoned that the city was not
required to prove that its ordinance would meet its substantial government
interest so long as the evidence it relied on “‘fairly support[s]’ . . . the city’s
rationale for its ordinance.”107 It similarly explained that a judiciary may
not substitute its own theory or draw its own conclusions from a city’s
study where there is more than one plausible way to interpret the data.108
100. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 299–301.
101. See id.
102. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 430.
103. Id. at 429–30.
104. See id. at 430–31; see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 46; Young, 427 U.S. at 63.
105. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 430.
106. Id. at 435, 438–39.
107. Id. at 438.–39.
108. See id. at 437–38, 440–42.
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The plurality noted that a city is in a better position than a court to gather
and interpret data on local problems.109
However, the plurality here appeared to go further than Renton by
discussing the possibility of burden-shifting.110 The Court reasoned that
although a city cannot rely on “shoddy data or reasoning,” it may meet its
initial burden by an appeal to common sense and common judgment that its
regulation will mitigate the undesirable secondary effects.111 However, a
business can dispute this common sense evidence by either showing that
the city’s evidence does not support its rationale or introducing its own
evidence contradicting the city’s findings.112 The business must provide
“actual and convincing” evidence to do so.113 If the business successfully
does so, the “burden shifts back to the [city] to supplement the record with
evidence renewing support for a theory that justifies its ordinance.”114
The plurality found, however, that the city could rely on the 1977
police study and reasonably infer from the evidence that prohibiting an
adult business from operating in the same structure as another would
reduce crime.115 Thus, the city met its burden even where alternative
theories suggested that its ordinance would not affect crime rates
mentioned in the study.116 Because the adult business failed to cast doubt
on the city’s interpretation of the study or provide its own contrary
evidence, the ordinance was constitutional.117
III. SHOWTIME ENTERTAINMENT, LLC V. TOWN OF MENDON: THE
DISTRICT COURT’S FINDINGS AND THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S REVERSAL
In the instant case, the District Court of Massachusetts and the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s principles but
109. Id. at 440.
110. See id. at 439.
111. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438–39.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 439.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 436–37.
116. See id. at 437, 439.
117. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438–43.

BOND_FINALX2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

5/31/2016 12:53 PM

STRIPPING DOWN A VICTORY FOR ADULT ENTERTAINMENT

265

reached opposing conclusions.118
Both courts applied intermediate
scrutiny119 but they disagreed about whether Mendon’s bylaws targeted
Showtime’s secondary effects and whether the regulations were underinclusive, meaning they did not target other businesses that produced the
same secondary effects.120 The courts separately considered Mendon’s two
primary concerns: (1) protecting Mendon’s rural aesthetics and (2)
preventing traffic congestion.121 Under Renton and Alameda Books, the
district court found that Mendon met its burden.122 The First Circuit held
the opposite.123 Interestingly, the appellate court made only brief mention
of Renton and did not account for the Alameda Books burden-shifting
approach in its analysis.124 Rather, the “narrow application” of Mendon’s
zoning bylaws were “tellingly underinclusive,” such that Mendon failed to
prove its bylaws actually furthered a substantial interest in regulating the
secondary effects of adult-entertainment businesses.125
A. Protecting Mendon’s Rural Aesthetics
One of Mendon’s primary concerns when it enacted its adult
entertainment zoning bylaws was maintaining its historically rural
atmosphere.126 This primary concern embodies two related but distinct
concerns: maintaining its small-town charm and its surrounding property
values.127 According to Showtime, however, Mendon’s ordinance did not
118. See generally Showtime Entm’t, LLC v. Town of Mendon (Showtime II), 769 F.3d
61 (1st Cir. 2014); Showtime Entm’t LLC v. Ammendolia (Showtime I), 885 F. Supp. 2d 507 (D.
Mass. 2012).
119. Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 72 (“Therefore, recognizing that the zoning bylaws’
express terms set forth content-neutral purposes, we proceed in the application of intermediate
scrutiny while withholding judgment as to the bylaws’ true content neutrality.”); Showtime I, 885
F. Supp. 2d at 522, 529 (“[T]he regulations will be reviewed under the intermediate level of
scrutiny outlined in Renton.”).
120. See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 72–78; Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d 522–27.
121. See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 72–78; Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d 522–27.
122. Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 522–27.
123. Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 72–78.
124. See id. at 72.
125. See id. at 78.
126. See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
127. See id. at 521.

BOND_FINALX2 (DO NOT DELETE)

266

5/31/2016 12:53 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

address these concerns because less promiscuous neighboring parcels were
not subject to the same restrictions as Showtime’s adult entertainment
business.128 Neighboring developments, for instance, were larger than the
2,000 square foot restriction imposed on Showtime, yet did “not appear
particularly rural in character.”129 Thus, Showtime argued, the restrictions
were not genuinely designed to promote the visual character of the town,
but instead to suppress expression.130
The district court disagreed with Showtime’s arguments.131 Mendon
adequately justified its concern about aesthetic character because it
believed the addition of an adult business could further detract from the
town’s aesthetics.132 The town cited studies that supported a positive
correlation between adult entertainment businesses and blight, and a
negative correlation between adult entertainment businesses and
surrounding property values.133 Applying the burden-shifting approach
developed in Alameda Books, the district court found that Mendon had met
its initial burden because it could have reasonably concluded that imposing
a size requirement would mitigate these undesirable effects.134 Showtime
had not provided “actual and convincing” proof to discredit the negative
impact adult businesses have on neighborhoods, nor did it convince the
court that a nearly 9,000 square foot adult establishment would not detract
from the town’s charm.135
The First Circuit rejected the district court’s findings.136 Specifically,
it held that the size and height restrictions were so underinclusive that the
bylaws could not truly serve a substantial interest in maintaining the rural
character of the town.137 It was uncontested that the Adult Entertainment
128. Id. at 523.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 523–24.
132. Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 523–24.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 74.
137. Id. at 73–75.
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Overlay District is a heavily commercialized zone “far from rural in
nature,” and neighboring parcels that did not appear “rural” were not
subject to the same size and height restrictions as Showtime’s equally not
“rural” establishment.138 Further, the appellate court found that “a large
adult-entertainment business has no secondary effect distinct from a large
building of another sort, at least without reference to what goes on ‘in the
building.’”139 Thus, because Showtime had agreed to comply with other
regulations on building design and advertisements, Mendon failed to clarify
how Showtime’s building would harm the community’s rural aesthetics any
greater than a neighboring mainstream establishment would.140 The First
Circuit also rejected the notion that adult establishments negatively affect
neighboring property values.141 Mendon’s studies, the First Circuit
concluded, presented only “limited” effects on home prices located near
adult businesses and had no impact on homes more than several blocks
away.142
B. Preventing Traffic Congestion
Mendon next argued that the ordinance’s size and hour restriction
aimed to minimize significant traffic congestion caused by an influx of
foreign customers.143 In support, it provided studies supporting a
correlation between adult businesses and increased traffic congestion, and
offered evidence that adult businesses often draw customers from foreign
communities.144 The hour restriction, which prohibited Showtime from
operating its business during school hours, was intended to ensure that the
town’s school bus service would not suffer excessive traffic delays.145 The
size restriction, on the other hand, would reduce to two-thirds the number

138. Id. at 73–74.
139. Id. at 74.
140. Id. at 74–75.
141. Id. at 75 (accusing the town of attempting “to subtly change the contours of its stated
interest”).
142. Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 75.
143. See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 521–22, 524.
144. Id. at 524.
145. See id. at 519, 524.
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of patrons Showtime’s establishment could accommodate.146 While
Showtime originally designed its business to fit 244 customers, its
ordinance-friendly design could fit only 73.147
Showtime countered with its own evidence to appease Mendon’s
purported traffic concerns.148 For example, Showtime presented a study
concluding that any traffic congestion caused by its establishment would be
“negligible.”149 Thus, Showtime argued that Mendon’s purported interest
in curbing the secondary effects of traffic was mere pretext.150
The district court again applied Alameda Books and concluded that
Mendon, which had no obligation to conduct independent studies, had met
its initial burden because it was “entirely reasonable to expect” that a larger
building that accommodated more staff and customers would have a larger
impact on traffic than a smaller establishment.151 Additionally, Mendon
could reasonably conclude that excess traffic caused by the business would
delay the school bus system, and the town had an interest in restricting
opening hours to 4:30 p.m. to prevent such a conflict.152 On the other hand,
Showtime’s rebuttal study was flawed because it did not account for
cumulative traffic effects caused by neighboring parcels.153 Thus,
Showtime did not offer “actual and convincing” evidence to shift the
burden back to Mendon.154
Without applying the Alameda Books burden-shifting approach, the
First Circuit concluded, “Mendon . . . [did] not set forth evidence that the
bylaws actually further its substantial interest in curbing traffic congestion

146. See id. at 524.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 523.
149. Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
150. See id. at 521 (contending that “the true purpose of the hours restriction is not to
ameliorate traffic, but to prevent exposure of the regulated activity to children who ride the school
bus”).
151. See id. at 522–24.
152. See id. at 524.
153. Id. at 523.
154. See id. at 523 (“Plaintiff’s objections do not convincingly discredit the town's
asserted foundation for its zoning restrictions.”).
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in a manner sufficient to survive intermediate scrutiny.”155 First, the court
noted that Mendon failed to demonstrate how adult businesses cause any
more traffic than large, commercial businesses along the same route.156
Next, the First Circuit “conducted an independent review” of Mendon’s
proffered studies and found them to be “largely anecdotal” and
unsupportive of any realistic traffic concerns.157 Finally, even if the adult
business would attract traffic from out-of-town patrons, the court
hypothesized that a roadside restaurant offering an “early-bird dinner
special” would presumably cause the same effect, yet would not be subject
to Mendon’s size or operating restrictions.158 According to the First
Circuit, then, because Mendon did not impose regulations on other
businesses that caused the same alleged secondary effects as Showtime’s
business, “the bylaws [were] equally underinclusive as related to traffic
concerns as they were to Mendon’s rural aesthetic.”159
IV. ARGUMENT: THE FIRST CIRCUIT MISAPPLIED THE RENTON TEST AND
IMPROPERLY FOUND MENDON’S ORDINANCE INVALID
The First Circuit did not neatly apply the multi-step inquiry outlined
in Renton.160 First, it did not decide whether the regulation was a time,
manner, and place restriction or an outright ban.161 Since the ordinance
merely restricted the size of Showtime’s building and its hours of
operation, the ordinance indeed is properly considered a time, place, or
manner restriction.162 Second, the First Circuit declined judgment on
whether the ordinance was content-based or content-neutral.163 It explained
155. Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 76.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 76–77.
158. Id. at 77–78.
159. See id. at 76.
160. See Showtime Entm’t, LLC v. Town of Mendon (Showtime II), 769 F.3d 61, 72–78
(1st Cir. 2014).
161. See id. at 72–73 (explaining the content distinction but failing to characterize the
ordinance as a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction).
162. See Showtime Entm’t LLC v. Ammendolia (Showtime I), 885 F. Supp. 2d 507, 525
(D. Mass. 2012) (characterizing the ordinance as a content-neutral time, place, and manner
restriction).
163. See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 72.
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“the distinction is ultimately immaterial” because the ordinance could not
withstand even intermediate scrutiny typically reserved for content-neutral
bylaws.164
The crux of the First Circuit’s objection to the ordinance stems from
the remaining step of the inquiry, the two-part Renton test.165 Again, under
the Renton test, a zoning regulation of adult businesses is constitutional
where it: (1) is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government purpose
and (2) leaves open alternative channels of communication.166 In
particular, the First Circuit found that Mendon’s bylaws were not narrowly
tailored to serve a substantial government interest because Mendon failed
to prove that the adult establishment would alter the town’s rural aesthetics
or cause traffic congestion any more than other types of businesses not
subject to the regulation.167 Therefore, the bylaws were “tellingly
underinclusive” and could not survive intermediate scrutiny.168 The court
did not address whether the regulation left open alternative avenues of
communication.
As explained below, the First Circuit erred when it found that
Mendon’s zoning ordinance violated the First Amendment because it
imposed a heightened Renton standard.
A. Mendon’s Ordinance Is Narrowly Tailored to Serve Its Legitimate Goals
of Maintaining Its Rural Aesthetics and Preventing Traffic Congestion
The Supreme Court in Renton upheld a city ordinance that sought to
“preserve the quality of urban life.”169 Surely, the Supreme Court could see
similar value in preserving a town’s quality of rural life. Here, the First
Circuit explained that while Mendon’s interests in maintaining its aesthetic
charm and preventing traffic congestion were “theoretically” substantial,
164. Id.
165. The court did not specifically mention it was using the Renton test, but it outlined the
Renton framework. See id. at 71 (“This intermediate level of scrutiny allows regulations justified
by neutral purposes, rather than by the content of speech, to survive so long as they support a
significant government interest, do not burden substantially more speech than necessary, and
leave available alternative channels of communication.”).
166. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
167. See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 75, 78.
168. See id.
169. Id.
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Mendon failed to prove that restricting the size and hours of Showtime’s
establishment would serve these interests.170 However, Mendon’s bylaws
(1) further the town’s legitimate interest in maintaining its rural aesthetics
and preventing traffic congestion and (2) are narrowly tailored to serve
these goals.
1. Sufficient Evidentiary Support
The First Circuit struck down the ordinance, in part, because it found
that Mendon did not offer sufficient evidence that the regulations would
adequately address its purported government interests.171 As explained
below, Mendon reasonably relied on ample evidence to meet its burden
under Renton and Alameda Books.172
a. Aesthetics—Mendon’s Reasonable Conclusion that Adult Businesses
Detract from Small Town Charm and Decreased Property Values, Even if
Minimal, is Sufficient
As outlined above, the First Circuit reasoned that Showtime’s nonrural building would look identical to surrounding, non-rural buildings; the
adult business’s lack of rural character cannot affect Mendon’s aesthetic
charm any more than those equally-sized, non-rural structures; while
studies show neighborhoods experience negative effects caused by adult
entertainment businesses, the effects are limited in radius; these “patently
underinclusive” shortcomings suggest the dispute is about “what goes on in
the building” and is unrelated to the interest of maintaining the town’s
charm.173
The First Circuit’s reasoning fails for two reasons. While the court
correctly points out that the adult building’s exterior would mimic the nonrural appearance and non-rural character of neighboring establishments, (1)
Mendon could reasonably conclude that a gigantic adult business would
further detract from the quality of its small-town charm, and (2) Mendon is
entitled to impose restrictions that promote this interest, even though the
restrictions do not eradicate the problem entirely. As the district court
correctly observed, “the fact that some large structures now exist on [Route
170. See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 78.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 74–75.
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16] does not detract from the town’s concern that additional structures—
particularly ones dedicated to adult entertainment—would further detract
from the rural character of the town as a whole.”174 Thus, while Mendon
may be able to take more effective steps to solidify its small-town feel, it
could reasonably conclude that downsizing a 9,000 square foot nudeentertainment to 2,000 square feet could somewhat achieve its purpose.
From the “numerous studies, reports, and articles” the town submitted,
Mendon could reasonably believe that a gigantic adult business would
detract from the quality of its small-town appeal.175 Residents of other
towns, for example, have complained that adult businesses alter their smalltown feel and affect interactions with visiting business leaders.176 In this
respect, Mendon could reasonably conclude that a 9,000 square foot adult
business would detract from the quality of its small-town appeal more than
a 2,000, appreciably smaller, square foot building. And, consistent with
Justice O’Connor’s reasoning in Pap’s A.M., Mendon is entitled to take
minor steps to minimize harmful secondary effects, even where other
remedies may prove more effective.177 Therefore, Mendon met its initial
burden under Alameda Books because it relied on common judgment that
its ordinance would target the unwanted secondary effect.178 Showtime, by
contrast, has not provided “actual and convincing” evidence to rebut
Mendon’s rationale.179
174. Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 523 (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 521 n.12; see Amy Reinink, Adult Businesses vs. Small Area Cities,
GAINSEVILLE SUN, http://www.gainesville.com/article/20060227/LOCAL/202270353 202270353
[http://perma.cc/G5EE-RW7T]; Officials: Strip Clubs Tarnish City’s Image, AUGUSTA
CHRONICLE, http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/2000/04/30/met_289671.shtml#.VtNtopMrKRu
[http://perma.cc/B383-72ZQ]; see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 50 (explaining a city’s interest in
preserving its quality of urban life “must be accorded high respect”).
176. See Reinink, supra note 177 (reporting several rural communities in which the
residents complain about nude establishments ruining small-town values); Officials: Strip Clubs
Tarnish City’s Image, supra note 177 (reporting that foreign business leaders who visit the city of
Augusta, Georgia notice the presence of adult businesses across the street from the chamber of
commerce building, which is not the type of image city officials want to portray).
177. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 282, 300–01 (2000) (explaining that even
where a regulation may not greatly reduce the feared secondary effects, the regulation need only
“further the interest in combating such effects”).
178. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 438–39 (2002)
(explaining that a city can rely on common sense).
179. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439 (describing the “actual and convincing”
evidentiary standard).
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Mendon’s second rural aesthetic justification, maintaining property
values, fared no better before the appellate court. The First Circuit rejected
Mendon’s studies that purported to show that adult businesses cause a
decline in surrounding property values and found no evidence that adult
entertainment establishments have any true effect on the rural value of
homes in surrounding areas.180 Importantly, however, the First Circuit’s
reasoning fails because it imposes too high a burden on Mendon, as
explained below.
The Supreme Court has not specified the degree to which an adult
business must detrimentally affect a town before the town can mitigate the
business’s effect.181 Thus, even if the First Circuit is correct that
surrounding homes are only minimally affected, no case law supports its
conclusion that Mendon’s actions are unjustified.
Mendon could
reasonably have a substantial government interest in mitigating even small
impacts on its surrounding residential value.182
Additionally, the Supreme Court has long recognized a correlation
between declining property values and adult establishments. 183 Thus, even
if Mendon’s independent studies do not support this conclusion under
Pap’s A.M., Mendon can permissibly rely on studies from other towns or
from parties of former Supreme Court cases.184 Indeed, under Renton,
Mendon was not required to provide its own studies, and the fact that it did
further reinforces its justification.185 Based on its own studies and the
Supreme Court’s prior holdings, Mendon could reasonably conclude that a
smaller and subtler adult establishment would mitigate the effects of
decreasing property values.186 As the Renton Court noted, municipalities
180. Id.
181. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 51–52 (holding that a town must be allowed to determine
detrimental secondary effects and experiment with solutions).
182. See id. at 51–52; see also Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 300–01 (reasoning that even
where a regulation may not greatly reduce the feared secondary effects, the regulation need only
“further the interest in combating such effects”).
183. Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 55 (1976); Renton, 475 U.S. at 48
(upholding ordinance aimed in part at maintaining surrounding property values).
184. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 297 (holding that a party could rely on the city of Renton’s
findings).
185. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51–52 (finding that a city is not required to provide its own
studies but may rely on the experiences of other cities).
186. See id. (holding that a town must be allowed to determine detrimental secondary
effects and experiment with solutions); see also Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S at 300–01 (explaining that
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like Mendon must be given an opportunity to experiment with solutions to
important problems.187
In the 1999 case D.H.L. Associates v. O’Gorman, the First Circuit
properly adhered to the Renton standard and found that a town did not need
to provide its own studies, but could rely on the experiences of other cities
in enacting its ordinance restricting nude dancing at a restaurant.188 The
town needed only to provide some reasonable basis for believing that the
ordinance would alleviate the targeted secondary effects.189 The Supreme
Court’s Alameda Books decision allowed businesses the opportunity to cast
doubt on evidence relied upon by municipalities.190 When a business does
so, then, the Renton approach allowing towns to rely on outside studies
may not go far enough.191 Nevertheless, where the town has provided
sufficient evidence to support its position and the business has not disputed
the town’s findings by “actual and convincing evidence,” the town has met
its burden.192 Moreover, as mentioned earlier, a court cannot substitute its
own judgment for the town where the town’s interpretation of its evidence
is reasonable.193
Here, Mendon did far more than was required under Renton and
provided sufficient evidence to meet its burden under Alameda Books.194
Mendon actually provided numerous studies supporting its position.195 The
town cited a study where an appraiser identified “exterior building
appearance” as a factor that affects property values.196 It cited another
even where a regulation may not greatly reduce the feared secondary effects, the regulation need
only “further the interest in combating such effects”).
187. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 51–52 (holding that a town must be allowed to experiment
with solutions to secondary effects).
188. D.H.L. Assocs. v. O’Gorman, 199 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 1999).
189. See id.
190. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438.
191. See generally Renton, 475 U.S. 41 (making no mention of burden-shifting or
businesses providing contrasting studies).
192. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439.
193. Id. at 437–38.
194. See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
195. See id.
196. Id.
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study that found that “the more visible a sexually-oriented business is, the
more impact it has.”197
Furthermore, the First Circuit’s approach in requiring Mendon to
prove that its size and operating restriction is the only plausible solution to
maintaining its small town charm was nearly identical to the approach the
Supreme Court rejected in Alameda Books.198 The First Circuit improperly
came to its own conclusion based on the evidence before it, even where the
town’s interpretation of the data was reasonable.199 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court had stated a town must be granted reasonable latitude to
enact its own ordinances.200 Here, because Mendon “reasonably believed
[Showtime’s establishment was] relevant” to the town’s declining property
values, it should have been allowed to experiment with reasonable
solutions.201
As the district court in the instant case noted, the Supreme Court
“does not require a court to re-weigh the evidence considered by a
legislative body, nor does it empower a court to substitute its judgment in
regards to whether a regulation will best serve the community.”202 Rather,
“the court must give due credit to legislative statements of policy where . . .
they inform an inquiry into legislative purpose by identifying specific
secondary effects that the town may target without offending the
constitution.”203 For the reasons explained above, the First Circuit erred in
imposing too high a burden on Mendon.
b. A Court May Not Substitute its Judgment for Mendon’s Reasonable
Conclusion that Adult Businesses Significantly Increase Traffic Congestion
Although Mendon provided numerous studies explaining the effects
Showtime’s adult establishment would have on traffic, the First Circuit
conducted an “independent review” of the studies and determined that they
197. Id.
198. See id. at 75; see also Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 437–38.
199. See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 75; see also Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
200. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41,at 51–52 (1986) (holding that a town
must be allowed to experiment with solutions to secondary effects).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 521.
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were inadequate.204 According to the Court, the studies were “largely
anecdotal, rel[ied] nearly exclusively on personal perceptions rather than
verifiable data, and include[d] significant hedging language, such as
indicating that increased traffic is merely a hypothesis.”205 The court also
referenced a competing study offered by Showtime concluding that its
establishment would cause only negligible traffic effects.206
In a similar approach toward Mendon’s asserted interest in
maintaining rural aesthetics argument, the First Circuit erred by requiring
Mendon to prove that its ordinance would mitigate traffic.207 The court
improperly required that Mendon offer verifiable data, even though
Mendon could not empirically collect figures until after Showtime had
already built its establishment.208 Moreover, under Alameda Books, a
town’s initial burden requires no more than common sense to adjudge the
business’s likely secondary effects.209 It is reasonable to conclude, as the
District Court observed, that a 9,000 square foot building accommodating
244 customers and operating during school bus operating hours could cause
significant traffic delays.210
Furthermore, because restricting Showtime to downsize its building
and not operate during school hours was a plausible remedy to the area’s
traffic problem, the court should not have substituted its judgment for
Mendon’s.211 Mendon should have been granted latitude to experiment
with reasonable solutions to its problem.212
204. See id. at 76–77 (listing each study Mendon relied on).
205. Id. at 77.
206. Id. at 76.
207. See id. at 76–77.
208. There is no evidence of other strip clubs in the area and thus no way Mendon could
empirically test these hypotheses. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50 (“The Court of Appeals ruled,
however, that because the Renton ordinance was enacted without the benefit of studies
specifically relating to ‘the particular problems or needs of Renton,’ the city’s justifications for
the ordinance were ‘conclusory and speculative.’ We think the Court of Appeals imposed on the
city an unnecessarily rigid burden of proof. The record in this case reveals that Renton relied
heavily on the experience of, and studies produced by, the city of Seattle.”).
209. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438–39.
210. See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
211. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 437–38.
212. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 51–52 (holding that a town must be allowed to experiment
with solutions to secondary effects).
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Granted, the First Circuit noted that Showtime offered its own study
rebutting Mendon’s findings.213 Under Alameda Books, the burden of
proof may shift back to the town that enacts the ordinance when a business
successfully casts doubt on the town’s evidence by providing its own
study.214 However, the traffic study Showtime offered did not offer
verifiable data (its conclusions were hypothetical, given that the
establishment had not been built yet) and did not account for the
cumulative effect of traffic from neighboring parcels (as the district court
notably pointed out).215 Thus, Mendon, which was not required even to
provide its own studies, more than met its burden and Showtime failed to
cast doubt on these studies with “actual and convincing” evidence.
A rural case study conducted on an adult entertainment establishment
in Montrose, Illinois, supports Mendon’s insight.216 Soon after the “Lion’s
Den” opened in Montrose, an adult business marketing “X-rated videos,
books, and novelties” for purchase “24/7”, residents complained of
significant traffic increases.217 In fact, the gravel access road that led
toward the establishment broke down because it could not handle the
weight of big trucks that started making their way into the area.218 Before
the adult business had opened, foreign travelers had no reason to exit the I70 into Montrose.219 In short, Mendon’s traffic concerns were justified and
sufficiently supported.
2. Sufficient Narrow Tailoring
The First Circuit explained that “[m]ere reference to a neutral intent
does not suffice to satisfy Mendon’s burden to prove that its bylaws in fact
further a substantial government interest “220 It then found that despite
Mendon’s purported government interests, the ordinance did not ban more
213. See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 68.
214. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439.
215. See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 516, 523.
216. See Alan C. Weinstein & Richard D. McCleary, The Association of Adult Businesses
with Secondary Effects: Legal Doctrine, Social Theory, and Empirical Evidence, 29 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 565, 593 (2012).
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 72.
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wholesome businesses that caused the same detrimental secondary effects
as Showtime’s adult establishment.221 Thus, according to the court,
because the ordinance left unscathed all other businesses that also produced
these secondary effects, the ordinance was underinclusive.222
a. Regulating Only Businesses That Affect the Town’s Charm
The First Circuit found Mendon’s ordinance underinclusive, first,
because it curtailed Showtime’s speech without affecting similarly nonrural neighboring buildings.223 However, while the bylaws may appear to
single out Showtime’s business, Mendon did not act unconstitutionally.224
As noted earlier, a regulation must “affect only that category of
[establishments] shown to produce the unwanted secondary effects.”225 In
accordance with this rule, Mendon’s ordinance is no broader than necessary
to achieve its rural aesthetic and traffic goals. Thus, the First Circuit
should have found the ordinance valid.
The First Circuit did not provide sufficient justification that Mendon’s
bylaws are unconstitutionally under-inclusive, because underinclusiveness
“does not invalidate an otherwise-permissible zoning ordinance . . . [that] is
well-supported by a substantial government interest.”226 The court did not
consider that the promiscuous nature of Showtime’s business alone can
detract from town aesthetics, irrespective of its outer appearance.227 For
example, town-goers and visitors may stumble upon sexually explicit litter
in nearby areas.228 The district court also cited studies demonstrating a

221. Id. at 74.
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (“[T]he First Amendment
imposes not an ‘underinclusiveness’ limitation but a ‘content discrimination’ limitation” upon a
State’s prohibition of proscribable speech.”).
225. Renton, 475 U.S. at 52.
226. See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 73–74; Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
227. See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 524 (citing Mendon’s studies on positive
correlation between blight and adult business); Young, 427 U.S. 50 (accepting that adult
businesses cause secondary effects); Weinstein & McCleary, supra note 218, at 594 (presenting
evidence that the Lion’s Den “sexually explicit litter” decreased use of the nearby in park).
228. See Weinstein & McCleary, supra note 218, at 594.
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positive correlation between adult entertainment and blight.229
Furthermore, although the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that
adult businesses, specifically, can detrimentally impact the overall quality
of neighborhoods,230 the First Circuit readily and unjustifiably did
enunciated justification to depart from this approach. Instead, it reasoned
that a court should “rightly pay attention to underinclusiveness where it
reveals significant doubts that the government indeed has a substantial
interest that is furthered by its proffered purpose.”231 Its justification
appears to question whether Mendon’s government interests are mere
pretexts, since the restrictions do not affect all large commercial
structures.232 However, the appellate court failed to did explain how
neighboring movie theaters or hardware stores have the same detrimental
effect on a town’s aesthetic charm or property values as a 9,000 square foot
adult establishment. Indeed, as the Supreme Court explained in Renton,
Mendon can later rewrite its bylaws to include any businesses that it may
later discover cause the same detrimental secondary effects.233 Because
there is no reason to believe that other types of large businesses detract
from Mendon’s charm or residential property values, its bylaws are
narrowly tailored against adult businesses to further its stated goals.
b. Regulating Only Businesses Likely to Have Detrimental Effects on
Traffic
The First Circuit also found Mendon’s ordinance underinclusive
because it did not differentiate between traffic effects caused by
Showtime’s adult business and other types of businesses along Route 16.234
Further, the court determined that Mendon did not adequately explain why
commercial businesses/attractions (a diner’s “early-bird dinner special”)
229. See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 524 (citing Mendon’s studies on positive
correlation between blight and adult business).
230. See, e.g., Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (accepting city’s judgment that adult
businesses cause detrimental effects); Renton, 475 U.S. 41 (recognizing correlation between adult
businesses and secondary effects); Young, 427 U.S. 50 (accepting that adult businesses cause
secondary effects).
231. Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 73.
232. See id.
233. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 52–53 (explaining that a city can later re-write bylaws if
new businesses cause detrimental secondary effects).
234. See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 76–78.
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along Route 16.235 Yet the adult business in Renton made a similar
“underinclusive” argument,236 and there the Supreme Court expressly
concluded, “[t]hat Renton chose first to address the potential problems
created by one particular kind of . . . business in no way suggests that the
city has ‘singled out’ [Playtime Theatres] for discriminatory treatment.”237
Studies show that adult establishments serve as a special draw for outof-towners that may not have similar businesses in their hometowns.238 It
is unclear that a general movie theater, for example, attracts a similar
number of visitors. Moreover, although the First Circuit noted that out-oftowners may similarly flock to an early-bird dinner special, Mendon has
demonstrated no reason to fear the secondary effects caused by these
restaurants.239 As the Supreme Court explained in Renton, Mendon can
later rewrite its bylaws to impose size or time restrictions on a gigantic
restaurant offering an early bird dinner special if it fears the restaurant will
cause problematic traffic congestion.240 However, until other businesses
pose similar problems, Mendon “must be allowed a reasonable opportunity
to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.”241
Accordingly, Mendon’s bylaws are properly narrowly tailored to target
unwanted secondary effects.
B. Reasonable Alternative Avenues of Communication
Under the second element of the Renton test, an ordinance may
survive intermediate scrutiny only where it provides the affected business

235. Id.
236. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 52 (“[Playtime Theatres] contend that the Renton ordinance
is “underinclusive,” in that it fails to regulate other kinds of adult businesses that are likely to
produce secondary effects similar to those produced by adult theaters. On this record the
contention must fail.”).
237. Id. at 52–53.
238. See, e.g., Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 524 (referencing Mendon’s study showing
that adult businesses draw out-of-town patrons); see also Weinstein & McCleary, supra note 218,
at 593 (describing how residents were not used to traffic before the adult store opened, as
travelers had few other reasons to exit the I-70).
239. See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 78.
240. See id.; see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 52–53 (explaining that a city can later re-write
bylaws if new businesses cause detrimental secondary effects).
241. Renton, 475 U.S. at 52 (citing Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71).
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with “reasonable alternative avenues of communication.”242 Here, the First
Circuit did not apparently reach this element of the Renton test, perhaps
because it found that Mendon’s bylaws did not meet a substantial
government interest.243 In any event, Mendon’s ordinance clearly meets
this element. In both Renton and D.H.L. Associates, the courts respectively
affirmed decisions where the ordinances would have forced businesses to
relocate.244 In each of those cases, the issue of “alternative reasonable
communications” hinged on whether the areas that the businesses could
relocate to were reasonable.245 In Renton, the ordinance provided the adult
movie theater reasonable alternative avenues of communication where the
theater could have opened on any of 520 acres of land.246 According to the
Court, the 520 acres of land consisted of “ample, accessible real estate.”247
Similarly, the First Circuit in D.H.L. Associates found that the
restaurant had reasonable alternative avenues of communication where it
could have relocated to the area specifically zoned to allow adult
entertainment, even where there were only ten acres on which the
restaurant could operate.248 There, the First Circuit noted that courts must
look to multiple factors to determine whether a business can reasonably
relocate, including “the percentage of land theoretically available to adult
businesses, the number of sites potentially available in relation to the
population of the city, the number of sites compared with the existing
number of adult businesses, [and] the number of businesses desiring to
offer adult entertainment.”249 Here, by contrast, Mendon’s bylaws do not
even mandate that Showtime relocate its establishment.250 The ordinance
242. Id. at 50.
243. See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 78 (referencing “alternative channels of
communication” but not applying the facts to the test).
244. See generally Renton, 475 U.S. 41; D.H.L. Assocs., 199 F.3d 50.
245. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53; D.H.L. Assocs., 199 F.3d at 59–60.
246. Renton, 475 U.S. at 53.
247. Id.
248. D.H.L. Assocs., 199 F.3d at 59–60.
249. Id.
250. See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 516; see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (“As
JUSTICE POWELL observed in American Mini Theatres, ‘[if] [the city] had been concerned
with restricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to close them or
restrict their number rather than circumscribe their choice as to location.’”).

BOND_FINALX2 (DO NOT DELETE)

282

5/31/2016 12:53 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

allows Showtime to operate its establishment exactly where it is, but
requires that it merely decrease the size of the building and open after 4:30
p.m.251 Thus, the only aspect of Showtime’s speech that the ordinance
curtails, then, is based on the size and hours restriction.252 However,
because the business can still accommodate at least 73 patrons, can open
starting at 4:30 p.m., and can remain open throughout the night, Showtime
has more alternative means of communication than the businesses in
Renton and D.H.L. Associates.253 Accordingly, Mendon’s bylaws meet the
second element of the Renton test.
V. CONCLUSION
Robert Mangiaratti, Mendon’s legal counsel, stated, “[t]here’s no
evidence that the town of Mendon cares whether people dance nude or
whether they don’t.”254 Mangiaratti continued, I don’t think this is a
pretext [to ban adult entertainment], I think this is a small town concerned
about the impacts to the community.”255 If Mendon’s primary purpose was
to eliminate Showtime from opening altogether, it could have made its
bylaws far more restrictive or, like the ordinances in Renton and D.H.L.
Associates,256 forced Showtime to relocate.
Mendon has a legal right to prohibit businesses from causing harmful
effects to the town.257 Its reasons for somewhat limiting Showtime’s ability
to operate—maintaining its small-town charm and preventing traffic
congestion—are concerns common to many municipalities.258 Because
251. Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
252. See id.
253. See id. See generally Renton, 475 U.S. 41; D.H.L. Assocs., 199 F.3d 50.
254. Mike Gleason, Mendon, Strip Club Face Off on Alcohol Ban, MILFORD DAILY
NEWS
(Mar.
6,
2015,
12:26
PM),
http://www.milforddailynews.com/article/20150306/NEWS/150307615 [https://perma.cc/6D72TMFP].
255. Id.
256. See generally Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986); D.H.L. Assocs. v.
O’Gorman, 199 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 1999).
257. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 433 (2002) (holding that
a municipality can seek to eliminate harmful secondary effects).
258. Showtime Entm’t, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 73 (1st Cir. 2014); see
e.g., Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (accepting city’s judgment that adult businesses cause
detrimental effects); Renton, 475 U.S. 41 (recognizing correlation between adult businesses and
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these secondary effects Mendon sought to regulate are substantial
government interests and because Mendon’s bylaws pass the Renton test,
the ordinance passes constitutional muster and the First Circuit’s ruling
should be overturned.

secondary effects); Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (accepting that adult
businesses cause secondary effects).

